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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
l'Jature of the Case 
Thomas Peterson appeals, contending that the district court erred it 
summarily dismissed his successive petition for post conviction relief without providing 
him prior notice of the grounds upon which that dismissal was based that 
Mr. Peterson's claims of relief for ineffective assistance of counsel were procedurally 
defaulted because he did not raise them in his initial petition. He also contends that the 
district court erred by failing to address his renewed request for counsel, since his 
allegations established at least the possibility of a valid claim that trial counsel had 
provided ineffective assistance. As such, this Court should 
remand this case for further proceedings. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
the judgment and 
In the underlying criminal case (the second case), Mr. Peterson pied guilty to one 
count of violating a no contact order. (R., p.35.)1 He was sentenced to a unified term of 
five years, with three and one-half years fixed. (R., p.35.) That sentence was ordered 
to run concurrently with a sentence for a previous violation of that same no contact 
order (the first case). State v. Peterson, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 408, *2 
(Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2013) (the opinion from Mr. Peterson's subsequent appeal in those 
cases, as well as a subsequent case). Mr. Peterson's probation was revoked after he 
was bound over and pied guilty to a new charge of violating that same no contact order 
1 In reciting the factual history of this case, it appears that the district court implicitly took 
judicial notice of the record in the underlying criminal case. (See R., pp.35-36.) A 
motion for this Court to take judicial notice of the documents in its file from the direct 
appeal in that case has been filed concurrently with this brief. 
1 
(the third case), since that violation was also alleged as a probation violation in the 
first two cases. Id. Mr. Peterson filed a motion for leniency pursuant to I.C.R. 35 
(hereinafter, Rule 35) in the third case, which the district court denied. (R., pp.35-36.) 
He then filed notices of appeal from the orders revoking his probation in the first two 
cases and from the order denying his Rule 35 motion in the third case. State v. 
Peterson, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 408, *3 (Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2013). Those 
appeals were consolidated. Id. 
One of the claims in that appeal was that Mr. Peterson had been deprived of an 
adequate record on appeal because an exhibit which the State had submitted during the 
preliminary hearing in the third case (which he asserted consisted of documentation of 
various telephone and text communication records) had been lost by the district court. 
Id. at pp.3-5. The Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that the district court had not 
actually considered the documents in question, and therefore, their absence from the 
appellate record did not prejudice his direct appeal. Id. at p.5. The Court of Appeals 
also affirmed the district court's decisions to impose and execute Mr. Peterson's 
sentences. Id. at *7. 
While the direct appeals were pending, Mr. Peterson filed a petition for post 
conviction relief in the underlying criminal case, in which he challenged his trial 
attorney's competence with respect to the plea agreement and negotiations, and also 
challenged his sentence as being excessive. (R., p.36.) The district court summarily 
dismissed that petition. (R., p.36.) 
Thereafter, Mr. Peterson filed a successive petition for post conviction relief. 
(R., p.3-4.) In that petition, Mr. Peterson continued to claim that his due process and 
2 
civil rights had been violated by the district court's failure to maintain an adequate 
record. (R., pp.4, 9.) For example, Mr. Peterson alleged that the exhibits introduced at 
the preliminary hearing in the third case had been misplaced, which made it impossible 
to include them in the appellate record, and therefore, deprived him of his constitutional 
right to due process. (R., p.8.) In addition, he contended that trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance for failing to file a motion, as requested by Mr. Peterson, "to 
receive court transcripts from the preliminary hearing." (R., pp.4-5.) Mr. Peterson also 
moved for the district court to appoint him counsel on the successive petition. 
(R., pp:17-18.) 
The district court denied the request for counsel and filed a notice of intent to 
dismiss the petition. (R., pp.22-26.) The district court gave the following reasons for its 
decisions: (1) the due process and civil rights claims were barred by res judicata 
because they were raised in the direct appeal2; (2) Mr. Peterson had provided only a 
bare, conclusory allegation in regard to counsel's failure to request the transcript of the 
preliminary hearing; and (3) the assertion that counsel failed to request the transcript 
does not indicate that counsel failed to investigate some point relevant to the defense. 
(R., p.24.) However, the district court provided an exemplar response that Mr. Peterson 
might use to clarify his allegations so that they would present a viable claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. (R., p.25.) It also informed Mr. Peterson, "[a]dditional 
information that would be helpful to the Court in determining whether to appoint counsel 
on this claim, but which is not required includes: 1) what is Mr. Peterson's 
2 Mr. Peterson is not challenging the decision to dismiss the due process and civil rights 
claims, insofar as, could and should they have been raised in the direct appeal, they 
were. 
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understanding concerning the reason his attorney declined to ask the Court for the 
transcript; and 2) was the attorney in question present at the preliminary hearing?" 
(R., p.25 (emphasis from original.) The district court concluded that, "[u]pon timely 
receipt of this supplemental affidavit, the Court will reconsider the issue of appointing 
counsel and whether the petition should be dismissed." (R., pp.25-26.) 
Following the form provided by the district court, Mr. Peterson filed a 
supplemental affidavit. (R., pp.32-33.) In that affidavit, he alleged that "this transcript 
[of the preliminary hearing in the third case] was to provide the courts with factual 
evidence that [the alleged victim] not only initiated contact but manipulated and bribed 
me to continue contact even though there was a no contact order." (R., p.32.) He also 
alleged that "[t]he transcripts will show prosecution submitted 'phone records' and 'text 
message records' as exhibit 'A' of evidence," and that "seeing those transcripts would 
[ha]ve persuaded me to request to see the evidence before I accepted a plea offer." 
(R., pp.32-33.) He continued, alleging that, upon making the request for the transcript 
of that preliminary hearing, "it would have been found that the evidence did not exist, 
further knowing there was no such phone records or text messages I would have taken 
CR-FE-2011-0003748 to trial." (R., p.33.) As a result, he alleged that would not have 
pied guilty in the third case, and therefore, would not have been found in violation of his 
probation in the second case (which is the criminal case underlying this successive 
petition for post conviction relief). (R., pp.32-33.) He also answered one of the district 
court's other questions, alleging that trial counsel was not at the preliminary hearing in 
question, and "that is another reason I requested that he ask for the transcripts." 
(R., p.33.) 
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However, in the interim between the filing of the district court's notice of intent to 
dismiss and Mr. Peterson's supplemental affidavit, the State filed an answer to his 
petition. Besides denying all of Mr. Peterson's relevant allegations, the State's answer 
asserted that Mr. Peterson's allegations should be barred because they needed to be, 
but were not, raised in his initial petition for post conviction relief. (R., p.29.) The State 
did not file any other documents, such as a motion for summary dismissal. (See 
generally R.) 
Ultimately, the district court recognized Mr. Peterson's timely response to the 
notice of intent to dismiss, but dismissed his claim of ineffective assistance because he 
had failed to raise it in his initial petition. (R., pp.39-40.) It also determined, as an 
alternative basis for summary dismissal, the facts alleged by Mr. Peterson in his 
supplemental petition would not have established a defense, merely mitigation at 
sentencing, and that the information was, in fact, argued as mitigation at sentencing. 
(R., p.40.) Furthermore, it found that Mr. Peterson's conclusion - that the exhibit in 
question would have been found to be misplaced - was not persuasive on the issue of 
whether counsel's performance was deficient, since no one knew that Exhibit A was 
missing until the direct appeal was underway. (R., p.41.) As such, it decided that 
counsel's performance, based on the information known at the time, was reasonable. 
(R., p.41.) Therefore, the district court determined that Mr. Peterson had failed to state 
a genuine issue of material fact. (R., pp.40-41.) The district court did not reconsider 
whether Mr. Peterson had stated a potential issue meriting the appointment of post 
conviction counsel. (See generally R., pp.35-42.) 
5 
a result of 
Mr. 
appeal from that judgment. 
the district court 
) Mr. 
, pp.46-48.) 
6 
a judgment summarily 
filed a timely notice of 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court erroneously summarily dismissed Mr. Peterson's 
successive petition without providing him notice of the reason for dismissal and 
providing him a meaningful opportunity to respond thereto. 
2. Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing IVlr. Peterson's petition 
without first resolving the question of whether counsel should be appointed and 
when his allegations established the possibility of a valid claim. 
7 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erroneously Summarily Dismissed ~,1r. Peterson's Successive Petition 
Without Providing Him Notice Of The Reason For Dismissal And Providing Him A 
Meaningful Opportunity To Respond Thereto 
Post-conviction cases are civil in nature. Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153 
(2008). The petitioner in such cases must make more than a short and plain statement 
of the claim; he must support his petition by a statement that "'specifically set[s] forth the 
grounds upon which the application is based."' Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 674-75 
(2010) (quoting Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 249-51 (2009). The petition also 
to be accompanied by admissible evidence in support of the allegations. Id. To 
that point, if the petition is verified, it functions as an affidavit, and so, presents evidence 
in support of the allegations. Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho 933, 936 (Ct. App. 2005); 
Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 593 (Ct. App. 1993). 
The district court may summarily dismiss a petition if it "is satisfied, on the basis 
of the application, the answer or motion, and the record, that the applicant is not entitled 
to post-conviction relief and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings." 
I.C. § 19-4906(b ). However, before the district court may summarily dismiss the 
proceedings, particularly if the petition was filed pro se and includes a request for 
appointment of counsel, '"[i]t is essential that the petitioner be given adequate notice of 
the claimed defects so he has an opportunity to respond and to give the trial court an 
adequate basis for deciding the need for counsel based upon the merits of the claims."' 
DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 601 (2009) (quoting Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 
679 (2001 ), superseded by statute on other grounds). "Failure to provide such notice 
8 
and opportunity to be heard may result in the reversal of a summary dismissal of a 
petition for post conviction relief." Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 676. Furthermore, "[w]hen the 
right [to have claims resolved on their merits] is affected by a defective notice of 
proposed dismissal, this Court cannot disregard the error." Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 
438, 442 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Baker v. State, 142 Idaho 411, 421 (Ct. App. 2005)). 
The reason the district court gave for its decision to summarily dismiss 
Mr. Peterson's petition was that the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was 
procedurally defaulted, as it had not been raised in his initial petition for relief. 
(R., pp.39-40.) The district court recognized that it did not mention that as a justification 
in its notice of intent to dismiss. (R., p.39; see generally R., pp.22-26.) In fact, the only 
place that justification had been mentioned was in the State's answer to the petition. 
(R., p.29; see generally R.) However, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that making 
such a claim in the answer to a petition for post conviction relief does not satisfy the 
notice requirement. See Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322 (1995). 
Specifically, the Supreme Court held that, "when the state files an answer, as it did 
here, the petitioner can rightly expect the matter will go to an evidentiary hearing on the 
issues framed by the pleadings, unless the district court provides a twenty-day notice of 
intent to dismiss, or the state files a motion for summary disposition." Id. The Court 
continued: "Under the circumstances, we do not believe the state's general request in 
the Answer's prayer for relief can fairly constitute a 'motion."' Id. 
In its answer in that case, the State "denied Saykhamchone's allegations of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, and raised various affirmative defenses." See id. at 
321. That answer concluded by requesting that the district court "[d]ismiss the Petition 
9 
Relief in entitled action without further hearing 
pursuant 19A901, seq." Id. "The State filed no pleadings 
than its Answer, and never filed or presented orally a motion for summary disposition of 
the application." Id. The State's actions in this case are very similar to the ones it took 
in Saykhamchone. The State denied Mr. Peterson's allegations of ineffective 
assistance of counsel and raised various affirmative defenses. (R., pp.27-29.) 
It concluded by requesting that "The Petitioner's claims for post-conviction relief be 
denied ... [or] dismissed." (R., p.30.) It did not file any other pleadings, nor did it file or 
present any motions for summary disposition. (See generally R.) In such cases, "the 
state's prayer for in the Answer was deficient [to provide notice] for not stating its 
grounds with particularity, and for not stating that it was the state's motion for summary 
disposition under I.C. § 19-4906(c)." Saykhamachone, 127 Idaho at 
from original). 
(emphasis 
As a result, because the justification for summary dismissal - that the claims 
were procedurally defaulted for not being raised in the initial petition - was not included 
in the notice of intent to dismiss the petition, and because the claim in the State's 
answer was insufficient, Mr. Peterson did not receive the requisite notice and 
opportunity to respond to that justification.3 Therefore, the judgment should be vacated 
3 It is possible that Mr. Peterson could, given the meaningful opportunity (particularly if 
he were afforded the assistance of counsel), justify why these claims were not 
presented in his initial petition. After all, the post conviction statute expressly allows for 
claims not raised in an initial petition to be presented in a successive petition, provided 
the petitioner can show "sufficient reason [such claim] was not asserted or was 
inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application." I.C. § 19-
4908. 
10 
and this case remanded so that Mr. Peterson is afforded the requisite notice and 
opportunity to respond. 
11. 
The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Peterson's Petition Without First 
Resolving The Question Of Whether Counsel Should Be Appointed And When His 
Allegations Established the Possibility Of A Valid Claim 
Even where the appellate courts have found a lack of proper notice, they have, at 
times, looked to the merits of the petition to determine if the dismissal was nevertheless 
appropriate. See Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 676-77; Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 865 
(Ct App. 2010); but see Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 328 ("[B]ecause Saykhachone 
was not given proper notice, we also reverse the district court's ruling that 
Saykhamchone's application raised no genuine issue of material fact. . . . [l]f 
Saykhamchone had been given [the requisite notice), Saykhamchone might have been 
able to respond in a way that would raise a genuine issue of material fact.") However, 
even if notice had been provided in this case, summary dismissal was still not 
appropriate because Mr. Peterson had renewed his request for appointment of counsel 
(R., p.33) and the district court did not address that motion before deciding the 
substantive question of whether summary dismissal was appropriate.4 (See generally 
R., pp.35-42.) By not resolving the motion for counsel before summarily dismissing the 
4 This is particularly concerning in this case, since the district court told Mr. Peterson 
that, "[u]pon timely receipt of this supplemental affidavit, the Court will reconsider the 
issue of appointing counsel." (R., pp.25-26.) The district court did not make good on 
that promise despite the fact that Mr. Peterson timely filed a supplemental affidavit, 
which conformed to the district court's stated suggestions for clarification. Furthermore, 
the fact that the district court told Mr. Peterson how to respond is indicative of the fact 
that Mr. Peterson had raised the possibility of a valid claim, if he presented it in the form 
the district court provided. 
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petition, the district court V. ·140 Idaho 789, 
Additionally, assuming that Mr. Peterson is able to make an argument for tolling 
the time to file this claim, summary dismissal was also inappropriate in this case 
because Mr. Peterson's allegations established the possibility of a valid claim, if not a 
genuine issue of material fact, that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Therefore, he should have, at least, been appointed counsel in this post 
conviction case. 
The standard a pro se petitioner must meet to justify appointment of counsel is 
not as high as the standard surviving summary dismissal. To merit appointment of 
counsel, a petitioner must simply allege facts raise the possibility of a valid claim. 
Id. Pro se petitioners are held to this low standard because the Idaho Supreme Court 
has recognized that "petitions and affidavits filed by a pro se petitioner will often be 
conclusory and incomplete. Although facts sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged 
because they do not exist, they also may not be alleged because the pro se petitioner 
simply does not know what are the essential elements of a claim." Id. at 792 (quoting 
Brown, 135 Idaho at 679). Therefore, the purpose of appointing post conviction counsel 
is to assist the pro se petitioner who has a valid claim, but who may struggle in 
presenting all the necessary components of that claim, in arguing a genuine issue of 
material fact, and so, survive summary dismissal of a legitimate claim for relief. See id. 
After all, it is preferable for claims to be resolved "on the merits rather than on 
technicalities." Carl H. Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 871 
(1999). 
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In determining whether the petitioner has met this burden, "every inference must 
run in the petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at the time and cannot 
be expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts." Charboneau, 140 
Idaho at 794. Only if, after running all the inferences in the petitioner's favor, the 
pleadings still fail to set forth the possibility of a non-frivolous issue, may the district 
court deny the request for counsel. Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 24 (Ct. App. 2009). 
To allege facts to make out the possibility of a valid claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the petitioner must allege facts which demonstrate that counsel's 
performance fell below a reasonable standard and that the petitioner was prejudiced by 
that deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 ( 1984 ); 
McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 850 (2004). In regard to the second prong of the 
Strickland test, a petitioner shows prejudice when he demonstrates that there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different, or, in other words, 
he must undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; 
McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570 (2010). In cases where, as here, the petitioner 
alleges ineffective assistance relating to his decision to enter a guilty plea, he must 
show "'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."' Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 
612, 621 (2011) (quoting Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 676 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 
52, 59 (1985))). 
In this case, Mr. Peterson alleged facts which raised not only the possibility of a 
valid claim. An attorney provides objectively unreasonable performance if it is shown 
that counsel failed to conduct a reasonable, prompt, and thorough investigation. 
13 
Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 280 (1998). That is particularly true if the petitioner 
can show that the "known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate 
further." Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 146 (Ct. App. 2006). Mr. Peterson alleged 
that he requested trial counsel ask for the transcript of the preliminary hearing from the 
related case. (R., p.5.) He alleged that investigation of the preliminary hearing 
transcripts would "show prosecution submitted 'phone records' and 'text message 
records' as exhibit 'A' of evidence," and that, "seeing those transcripts would [ha]ve 
persuaded me to request to see the evidence .... " (R., pp.32-33.) He also alleged 
that, upon making that investigation, "it would have been found that the evidence did not 
exist." (R., p.33.) 
Since the State has the burden of proof in criminal cases, a reasonable attorney 
would definitely investigate further upon finding that the evidence purportedly supporting 
the only charge in the complaint was missing and potentially nonexistent. The 
implication of lost or missing evidence is that the State would be unable to prove 
Mr. Peterson guilty at trial, and thus, he would have won an acquittal in the third case. 
(See R., pp.31-33.) By the same token, the State would be unable to prove the 
probation violation in this case, and therefore, his probation in this case would not have 
been revoked. Thus, the uncontradicted facts establish that trial counsel did not 
investigate that evidence, and so, establish that trial counsel's performance was 
objectively unreasonable. Therefore, drawing the inferences in Mr. Peterson's favor, his 
allegations establish the possibility of a valid claim that his attorney had provided 
ineffective assistance. 
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Mr. Peterson also alleged the possibility of prejudice arising from that deficient 
performance, as he asserted that "seeing those transcripts would [ha]ve persuaded me 
to request to see the evidence before I accepted a plea offer," and that "knowing there 
was no such phone records or text messages I would have taken CR-FE-2011-00037 48 
to trail." (R., pp.33.) As a result, he alleged that would not have entered the guilty plea 
which was the basis for the revocation of probation in this case. (R., pp.32-33.) That 
allegation certainly undermines confidence that Mr. Peterson would have pied guilty 
when he did, and so, raises the possibility of prejudice arising from the deficient 
performance. 
In light of Mr. Peterson's allegations, the district court's alternative reason for 
summarily dismissing the petition - that, based on the information available at the time 
Mr. Peterson pied guilty, which did not include the fact that Exhibit A was not maintained 
as part of the record since that fact was not discovered until the direct appeal was 
underway, counsel's performance was reasonable (R., p.41) - does not justify the 
decision to not appoint post conviction counsel. The claim Mr. Peterson raised was that 
counsel was ineffective for not looking for that additional, relevant information before 
advising Mr. Peterson to plead guilty. Therefore, regardless of what facts were known 
at the time, there is a possibility that counsel's performance was still deficient because 
he did not fulfill his duty to investigate the case. 
Therefore, Mr. Peterson alleged the possibility of a valid claim, and should have 
been appointed counsel to represent him on his successive petition. As such, this Court 
should remand the case for appointment of counsel to assist Mr. Peterson in taking 
15 
meaningful opportunity to respond the 
summary 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Peterson respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment summarily 
dismissing his successive petition for post conviction relief, and remand this case for 
further proceedings following appointment of counsel. 
DATED this 15th day of October, 2014. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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